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Abstract
This paper shows that the semantics of shenme 'what' exhibits a double quantification
phenomenon in Chinese bare conditionals. I show that such double quantification can be nicely
accounted for if one adopts Carlosn's semantics of bare plurals and verb meanings as well as the
assumption that shenme 'what' may denote kinds of things as bare plurals do.
1. Introduction
In this paper, I am going to examine the differences between shei 'who' an shenme 'what' in what
Cheng and Huang (1996) refer to as "bare conditionals". In such constructions, the conditional
and consequent clauses each contain a wh-phrase of the same form and the choice of value for the
second wh-phrase varies with the choice of value for the first wh-phrase. This construction is
illustrated in (1).
(1) Shei xian lai, shei xian chi
who first come who first eat
`If x comes first, x eats first./Whoever comes first eats first.'
I will show that the semantics of shenme 'what' and shei 'who' in such constructions differ with
respect to how they refer. When the two wh-phrases in pair in bare conditionals involve shei
`who', they must refer to the same person as in (1); but when the wh-phrases in pair involve
shenme 'what, they may refer to the same object as in (2) or they may refer to a different object
but of the same kind as in (3).
(2) Wo zheli de dongxi, ni yao shenme, jiu na shenme
I here Gen thing you want what	 then take what
`As for my things here, if you want x, then you can take x.'
(3) a. Ni dapo shenme, jiu de qu mai shenme (lai pei)
you break what then must go buy what to compensate
Lit. 'If you break what, then you must go to buy what for compensation.'
b. Gege you shenme, wo jiu ye yao you shenme
brother have what	 I then also want have what
Lit. 'If my brother have what, then I also want to have what.'
(2) does not need comments; (3) is worth some more remarks. Imagine a situation where a person
breaks a bowl and is asked to compensate for it. In this case, if (3a) is to be true, the person who
broke the bowl has to buy a new bowl which is different from the original one for compensation.
The meaning of shenme 'what' in (3a) can be compared with the meaning of it in (4).
(4) If you break a bowl, then you have to buy it for compensation.
Unlike (3a), for (4) to be true, what you have to buy for compensation is the original bowl, which
is broken. The contrast between (3a) and (4) is similar to the contrast between (5) and (4), that is,
between it and one.
(5) If you break a glass, then you have to buy (another) one for compensation.
Similar remarks apply to (3b). (3b) can be true in a situation where someone buys a new computer
and his younger brother wants to have a computer too. In this situation, the two computers need
not be the same one though they could be of the same brand. It thus seems that the shenme-
anaphora seen in (3) is more like one-anaphora than it-anaphora.
In fact, a large number of bare conditionals involving shenme 'what' are ambiguous between the
object-identity reading and the non-object-identity reading. One such example is (6).
(6) Ni xiang chi shenme, mama jiu zhu shenme gei ni chi
you want eat what mother then cook what for you eat
a. 'If you like to eat x, then mother cooks x for you to eat.'
b. `If you like to eat something of kind x, then mother will cook something of that kind for
you to eat.'
The purpose of this paper is to discuss what makes the interpretation of the two wh-phrases
different and how this difference can be accounted for. I will show that shei 'who' and shenme
`what' actually have different kinds of denotations. While shei 'who' denotes the same type of
things as proper names and definite descriptions, shenme 'what' may also denote the same type of
things as bare NPs, in additional to proper names and definite descriptions. On the basis of this, I
will suggest that in addition to 'thing x', shenme 'what' should also be optionally analyzed as
`kind x', parallel to the analysis of bare nouns. This, together with Carlson's (1977) semantics of
bare plurals and verb meanings, will account for why shenme-anaphora behaves like English one-
anaphora. Apart from the above issue, I will also show that unlike Carlson's approach to bare
plurals, Wilkinson's (1996) approach cannot be carried over to Chinese bare conditionals. Finally,
I will examine Heim's (1987) proposal of treating what as a disguised expression of 'something
of kind x', showing that it cannot be extended to Chinese bare conditionals, either.
2. A Distinction Between Shei 'who' and Shenme 'what'
Consider the contrast between (7) and (8).
(7) Q: Ni xihuan shei
you like who
`Who do you like?'
A: Wo xihuan Zhangsan/nei-ge nithai
I like Zhangsan/that-Cl girl
`I like Zhangsan/that girl.'
A': *Wo xihuan niihai/jinfa-nillang
I like	 girl/golden-hair-girl
`I like girls/blondes.
(8) Q: Ni xihuan shenme
you like what
`What do you like?'
A: Wo xihuan zhe-ben shu
I like this-C1 book
`I like this book.'
A': Wo xihuan shu
I like book
`I like books.'
The examples in (7) and (8) show that to answer a shei-question, either a proper name or a
definite description is an appropriate answer, but a bare NP is not. On the other hand, to answer a
shenme-question, one can respond with either a definite description or a bare NP. Shei 'who' and
shenme 'what' thus allow different ranges of possible answers. I take this fact to be an indication
that the two wh-phrases permit different types of denotations. Shei 'who' may denote something
of the same type as proper names or definite descriptions, whereas shenme 'what' may denote
something of the same type as proper names, definite descriptions or bare NPs. It should be
noticed here that Chinese does not have a plural marker. Therefore bare plurals take the form of
bare nouns. I will show that the above distinction between shei 'who' and shenme 'what', coupled
with Carlson's semantics of bare plurals to be discussed in the next section, will account for the
non-object-identity reading of shenme 'what' in bare-conditionals.
3. Carlson's Semantics of Bare Plurals
It is well-known that bare plurals do not have a constant interpretation, as is illustrated by the
examples in (9).
(9) a. Dogs are intelligent.
b. Dogs are available.
c. Dogs are widespread.
In (9a), the bare plural dogs seems to have the force of the quantifier most or almost all in that
exceptions are admitted. As for (9b), it is appropriate to say that existential force is involved.
Finally, none of the above interpretations is appropriate for the bare plural dogs in (9c). Here it
seems to refer to a kind of animals. Despite the variety of interpretations seen in bare plurals,
Carlson (1977a, 1977b) argues that they are uniformly kind-denoting terms and that the various
interpretations do not result from the ambiguity of the bare plurals themselves but can be
attributed predictably to some aspect of the predicate/context which they occur with/in. According
to Carlson, there are three subdomains of ontological entities in the world: stages, which are
"time-space slices of individuals", objects, which are the most familiar things like Jimmy Carter
or this chair , and kinds, which are individuals themselves such as the species dogs or horses.
Since the predicate widespread in (9c) applies exclusively to kinds and the bare plural dogs is a
kind-denoting term, (9c) translates as (10).
(10) Widespread'(d)
("d" in (10) stands for the kind of animals that are dogs.) On the other hand, the predicate
intelligent in (9a) basically applies to objects but can be elevated by the "gnomic" operator Gn to
a kind-level predicate, therefore giving the bare plural generic attribution. The translation of (9b)
is (11).
(11) Gn(Aintelligene)(d)
Finally, stage-level predicates select existential readings. Carlson argues that this is "the result of
applying a predicate which makes a claim about stages to the bare plural". According to him, a
stage-level predicate such as available translates as (12), where R represents a realization relation,
xk a kind-level variable and s a stage-level variable.)
(12) available: Xxlays[R(y,x) & available'(y)]
Thus, when the predicate available is applied to dogs, whose translation is XPvP(d), we get the
semantic interpretation (13).
(13) XPvP(d)(^Xxk3ys [R(y,x) & available'(y)])
= 3ys[R(y,d) & available'(y)] (after X-reduction)
When a stage-level predicate is generalized, it can also give a generic attribution to its subject,
giving a generic reading. I omit the details here. This way, Carlson successfully accounts for why
bare plurals may have a variety of interpretations, though they are uniformly analyzed as kind-
denoting terms.
4. A Semantic Analysis of Bare-conditional Donkey Sentences
As mentioned, proper names and definite descriptions denote the type of entity of what Carlson
calls objects. Since the denotation of shei 'who' ranges over the same kind of individuals as
proper names and definite descriptions, on the assumption that shei 'who' is a proform of proper
names and definite descriptions, it must introduce object-level variables in bare conditionals. On
the other hand, the denotation of shenme 'what' ranges over the same kind of entities as proper
names, definite descriptions and bare nouns. So, on the assumption that shenme 'what' is a
proform of proper names, definite descriptions and bare nouns, it should be able to introduce
kind-level variables--if Chinese bare NPs denote kinds of things as I will argue later, in addition
to object-level variables. I show below that this distinction is the key to unmasking the puzzle
why bare-conditional donkey sentences involving shei 'who' are never ambiguous but those
involving shenme 'what' can be ambiguous.
To begin with, some assumptions are in order. Following Cheng and Huang (1996) and Lin
(1996), I assume that wh-phrases in Chinese "bare conditionals" introduce restricted free
variables that must be bound by some operator around the construction. Also, I assume with
Kratzer (1978), Heim (1982) and Kadmon (1987) that if a conditional does not contain an overt
operator for the conditional clause to restrict, it can be understood as involving a null necessity
operator or a covert adverb of quantification roughly equivalent to generally or always. These null
operators can bind the variables introduced by the wh-phrases (Cheng and Huang (1996) and Lin
(1996)).
Now consider (3) again, repeated below.
(3) shei xian lai, shei xian chi
who first come who first eat
`If x comes first, x eats first.'
Since the wh-phrase shei 'who' only introduces an object-level variable, the tripartite structure of
(3) is (14), where the universal quantifier represents the implicit adverb of quantification of the
bare conditional.
(14) Vxo [x° is a person and xo comes first] [xo is a person and xo eats first]
In (14), since the object-level variable x° in the restriction and the one in the nuclear scope are
semantically bound by the same implicit universal operator, the value for the two variables is
always the same. This explains why the two shei's 'who' in (3) must refer to the same individual.
Next, let us consider the case of shenme 'what'. As discussed previously, (8) contrasts with (3) in
that the two wh-phrases do not refer to the same object, though they involve a higher level
identity.
(8) Ni dapo shenme, jiu de qu mai shenme (lai pei)
you break what then must go buy what to compensate
Tit. If you break what, then you have to buy what for compensation.'
(8) has a reading equivalent to something like "If you break a glass, then you have to go to buy a
glass for compensation. If you break a bowl, then you have to go to buy a bowl for compensation.
If you break a plate, then you have to go to buy a plate for compensation. And so on and so forth".
In other words, for any value assignment which makes the conditional clause in (8) true, it should
also make the consequent clause true and this value must be a kind of things. Moreover, given a
kind of things as the value for the wh-phrase shenme 'what', that kind of things is understood as
being existentially quantified. Imagine a glass-breaking event. If a glass-breaking event takes
place, one certainly does not break all the glasses that constitute the kind of things called glass but
some glass(es) that realize(s) that kind. Likewise, one can only buy some objects realizing the
kind of things called glass but not the kind itself, because the verb mai 'buy' does not apply to a
kind-level entity. One can paraphrase this semantic intuition of (8) as follows.
(15) For any kind of thing x, if there exists some object y of kind x that you break, then there
must exist some object z of kind x such that you go to buy z for compensation.
If this paraphrase of (8) is correct, this means that the two shenme's in (8) must simultaneously
involve existential quantification over object-level variables and universal quantification over
kind-level variables. How is this double quantification possible? Doesn't the wh-phrase shenme
`what' introduce a single variable under Kamp's (1981) or Heim's (1982) analysis of indefinites?
A solution to the above puzzle suggests itself when one recalls Carlson's (1977) semantics of bare
plurals and verb meanings. Recall that the denotation of shenme 'what' ranges over bare nouns,
proper names and definite descriptions. Thus, on the assumption that shenme 'what' is a proform
of bare nouns, it is reasonable to assume that shenme 'what' can have a denotation similar to that
of bare nouns, in addition to that of proper names and definite descriptions. Now suppose that one
analyzes Chinese bare nouns the same way as Carlson (1977) analyzes English bare plurals; that
is, bare nouns are names of kinds of things. In fact, Krifka (1995) has argued for this position for
Chinese bare nouns. Then, it is reasonable to say that the indefinite wh-phrase shenme 'what'
can introduce either a kind-level variable or an object-level variable. If the wh-phrase shenme in
(8) introduces a kind-level variable, then coupled with Carlson's style of verb meanings for dapo
`break' and mai 'buy', (16) will be the logical form of (8).
(16) Vxk [3ws[R(w,xk) & break'(you',w)]][3zs[R(z,xk) & go-to-buy-for-compensation'(you',z)]]
(16) claims that for all x, x a kind of things, if you break some stage of x, then you have to go to
buy some stage of x. The translation (16) captures the intuition that both wh-phrases in (8) have
existential force. They have existential force because verbs like dapo 'break' and mai 'buy' have
existential quantification over stage-level variables as part of their meaning when their object is a
kind (as in Carlson's analysis of available in (12).) The non-object-identity reading of (8) is
therefore explained, because each stage variable is bound by an independent existential quantifier
introduced by the verb meaning. Moreover, since stages of a kind may be different, the stage of
some kind of things that you break and the stage that you buy for compensation need not be the
same. Apart from the stage-level variables bound by the existential quantifier, the logical form of
(16) also contains kind-level variables. These variables are those introduced by the two shenme 's
`what' and are bound by the implicit universal operator of the conditional. It is the binding of the
kind-level variables by the implicit universal operator that is responsible for the intuition that the
two shenme's in (8) involve a higher level identity though they do not denote the same object-
level individual. We thus account for why the wh-phrase shenme 'what' in (8) seems to involve
double quantification and why shenme-anaphora in this case is more like one-anaphora than it-
anaphora.
The above approach also accounts for why (13) is ambiguous.
(6) Ni xiang chi shenme, mama jiu zhu shenme gei ni chi
you want eat what mother then cook what to you eat
a. 'If you like to eat x, then mother will cook x for you to eat.'
b. 'If you like to eat something of kind x, then mother will cook something of that kind for
you to eat.'
The ambiguity of (6) arises simply because the wh-phrase shenme 'what' can introduce an object-
level variable as well as a kind-level variable. If an object-level variable is introduced by the two
wh-phrases in (6), they will semantically refer to the same individual; on the other hand, if kind-
level variables are introduced, the two wh-phrases only refer to the same kinds of things, but not
the same objects.
5. Wilkinson's (1991) Semantics of Bare Plurals
As discussed above, Carlson has uniformly analyzed bare plurals as kind-denoting terms and
treated existential readings as a result of verbs applying to stages. However, this analysis has been
attacked by Wilkinson (1991), who tries to eliminate stages from Carlson's ontology of things. In
this section, based on the result in section 4, I will show that Carlson's existential quantification
over stages is independently needed, at least, in Chinese bare-conditional donkey sentences. I will
first briefly outline Wilkinson's (1991) analysis of bare plurals and then show that her approach
fails to account for existential interpretation seen in bare-conditional donkey sentences.
Opposing Carlson's stand, Wilkinson (1991) has argued that bare plurals are ambiguous between
names of kinds and variable interpretations. According to her view, bare plurals are kind-denoting
terms when they are subjects of predicates which apply exclusively to kinds such as common,
widespread or extinct, but can be analyzed along the lines of Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) when
they are subjects of stage-level or individual-level predicates. Thus, unlike Carlson's analysis
which would translate (17) and (18) as (19) and (20), respectively, she would translate the same
sentences as something like (21) and (22).
(17) Fireman are available. (stage-level, existential reading)
(18) Fireman are altruistic. (individual-level, generic reading)
(19) axs[R(x, & available'(x)]
(20) Gn(Aaltruistic')(0
(21) 3x[fireman'(x) & available'(x)]
(22) Genx[fireman'(x)][altruistic'(x)]
On Wilkinson's analysis, the existential reading of (17) arises because the individual variables
introduced by the bare plural are bound by the existential closure operator (See Heim (1982),
Diesing (1990,1992)). On the basis of this analysis, Wilkinson argues that existential
quantification over stages is not necessary. She also argues that Carlson's habitual sentences have
an alternative explanation along the lines of Stump (1985) and hence the use of stages can be
eliminated in those cases. Since habitual sentences are not the concern of this paper, I will not go
into the detail. On the other hand, Wilkinson attributes the generic reading of (18) to the fact that
the sentence structure contains a generic operator. It is this generic operator that binds the variable
introduced by the bare plural. She proposes that the generic operator is something like an adverb
of quantification such as generally or typically.
Despite Wilkinson's attack on Carlson's analysis, I think that Carlson's account for existential
readings of bare plurals in terms of stages and verb meanings is needed in the theory of grammar.
Let us consider (8) again.
(8) Ni dapo shenme, jiu de qu mai shenme (lai pei)
you break what then must go buy what to compensate
`If you break something of kind x, then you have to buy something of kind x (for
compensation).'
As discussed in the last subsection, the semantics of (8) involves double quantification, namely, a
universal quantification over kinds of things and an existential quantification over objects that
realize those kinds of things. I have shown that the existential interpretation of the two wh-
phrases in (8) is a consequence of applying the meaning of the verbs dapo 'break' and mai 'buy'
to NPs denoting kinds. The problem now is: can Wilkinson's (1991) approach to English bare
plurals be extended to sentences like (8)? If like my analysis, she also assumes that shenme 'what'
is a proform of proper names, definite descriptions and bare nouns, then shenme 'what' under her
analysis should be able to denote kind-level as well as object-level variables. Moreover, the
distribution of these two kinds of variables should be determined by the predicates which take the
variables as arguments. Namely, kind-level variables must be chosen when they are subjects or
objects of predicates which apply exclusively to kinds. Elsewhere, object-level variables must be
the denotation of the wh-phrases. These assumptions, however, would lead (8) to a nonexistent
reading. In (8), since the verb dapo 'break' and mai 'buy' are not among those predicates which
apply exclusively to kinds, the two shenme's 'what' must introduce object-level variables rather
than kind-level variables. It follows that the object that you break and the object that you buy
must be the same one, because both variables are bound by the same universal operator. However,
(8) does not have this reading.
I should note here that even if the two shenme's in (8) can introduce kind-level variables in
violation of Wilkinson's own assumption, the reading thus derived is still not right. On this
analysis, the logical form of (8) should be (23) below.
(23) Vxk[you break x ][you have to go to buy xk for compensation]
k .In (23), the kind-level variable x is bound by the universal quantifier, thus explaining universal
quantification over kinds of things. However, the logical form in (23) is inadequate. As noted, one
can only break or buy some objects/stages that realize a kind of things but cannot break or buy the
kind itself; namely, the wh-phrases in (8) must also be understood as being existentially
quantified. But this part of existential meaning is missing in (23). In order to have existential
quantification over objects, an object-level variable must appear. Yet no such variable seems
available under Wilkinson's approach, because presumably one wh-phrase only introduces one
variable at one time. There is no doubt that extra justification is needed if one wants to claim that
a single wh-phrase such as shenme 'what' can denote something like 'object x of kind y', i.e.,
introducing two different variables at one time. Since I know of no evidence that a single
indefinite can introduce two different variables at one time, I take (8) to be evidence that
Carlson's explanation of existential interpretation of bare plurals in terms of stages and verb
meanings is at least supported by Chinese data.
6. Heim's Analysis of What
My above analysis of the meaning of shenme 'what' in Chinese bare conditionals is closely
related to Heim's (1987) analysis of the meaning of English interrogative what in there-insertion
constructions. Safir (1985) has reported the judgements of the following examples.
(24) Which one of the two men was there ??in the room/* drunk?
(25) Which actors were there ??in the roomn*laughing?
(26) ?Who was there in the room when you got home?
However, Heim (1987) has found that (27) is completely acceptable.
(27) What is there in Austin?
As is well-known, definite NPs are not allowed to appear after there in there-insertion
construction. The above examples thus suggest that which is strong, just like that, whereas what
seems to be weak. In order to explain why what is acceptable in a there-insertion construction
such as (27), Heim first discusses (28).
(28) How many women do you blame?
She argues that to properly interpret (28), it must be semantically analyzed or reconstructed as
something equivalent to ?you blame x-many women, where x is quantified in by how. Namely, the
semantic analysis of how many N-questions involve reconstructing the wh-phrase back to its pre-
movement position except for the interrogative operator. Since x-many must qualify as weak by
any semantic definition in spite of the definiteness of the variable x, how many N can certainly
appear in there-insertion constructions.
Heim tries to assimilate the analysis of what to pied-piped wh-phrases such as how many N. She
suggests that wh-movement of what can be treated as some sort of pied-piping in disguise, similar
to wh-movement of how many N. She proposes that what should be analyzed as though it were
`something of what kind'. Therefore, a what-question involves reconstructing back 'something of
kind x' to its pre-movement position and only the variable x is bound by the interrogative operator
in Comp. Since 'something of kind x' is transparently indefinite, it follows that the trace of what
can appear after there in there-insertion constructions.
From the above discussion, it seems that my analysis of shenme 'what' in Chinese bare
conditionals is somewhat similar to Heim's analysis of English what in there-insertion
constructions. In this sense, Chinese bare conditionals can be said to support her analysis of what
as involving a kind-level variable. Nevertheless, one crucial difference between Heim's analysis
of English what in there-insertion constructions and my analysis of the kind-level shenme in
Chinese bare conditionals cannot be ignored. Under my analysis, the semantics of the kind-level
shenme 'what' in bare conditionals introduces only a kind-level variable and that is all there is for
the meaning of the kind-level shenme 'what'. Existential quantification over objects that realize
the kind is ascribed to the verb meaning rather than to the meaning of shenme 'what' itself. But
Heim's analysis of English what is different. Apart from introducing a kind-level variable, the
meaning of what also incorporates existential quantification over object-level things. Does this
difference makes any significant prediction?
Substituting Heim's analysis of English what for my analysis of Chinese shenme 'what' will, in
most cases, not make any difference for the truth conditions of Chinese bare conditionals. In
particular, her analysis of English what can also explain why in examples like (8), the two
shenme's need not refer to the same object, though they involve a higher level identity with
respect to kinds. They need not be coreferential with respect to object-level things, because each
shenme 'what' has its own existential quantifier. But the kind-level variables must be bound by
the same implicit universal operator, or vacuous quantification will result (Cheng and Huang
(1996)). However, in some cases, Heim's analysis of what seems to fail to assign a bare
conditional a proper truth conditions.
Consider (29).
(29) (Kan) shenme bijiao you jinian	 jiazhi erqie women ye mai-de-qi de,
see what more have memorial value and we 	 also buy-can-afford
women j iu song shenme
we	 then give what
`If x has more memorial value and we can afford x, then we will give him/her/them x.'
Observe that the antecedent clause in (29) involves a coordinate conjunction with a shared-wh-
constituent. Namely, the wh-phrase shenme 'what' in the conditional clause is simultaneously the
subject of the verb phrase bijiao you jinian jiazhi 'have more value' and the object of the second
verb mai-de-qi 'can afford'. What is significant about this fact is that the verb phrase in the first
coordinate and the verb in the second coordinate seem to select a different interpretation for the
shared wh-phrase. Notice that the interpretation of (29) can be said to be equivalent to the
following: If watches have more memorial value and we can afford to buy one, then we willgive
a watch; If necklaces have more memorial value and we can afford to buy one, then we will give
a necklace; and so on and so forth. In this interpretation, there is no particular watch or necklace
that has more value. It is the kind of things called watches or necklaces as a whole that has more
value. In other words, the verb phrase bijiao you jinian jiazhi in (29) selects a kind-level subject.
In contrast, the verb mai-de-qi 'can afford to buy', does not seem to select a kind-level object,
because people only buy (some) objects of a kind of thing, rather than buying the kind itself. ((29)
also has another reading in which the wh-phrase refers to an object-level entity. This reading is
not relevant to my discussion here.)
Above we have seen that the shared wh-phrase shenme 'what' in (29) can be interpreted
differently according to the predicate it combines with. However, this cannot be achieved by
extending Heim's analysis of what to Chinese shenme 'what'. Although theoretically, Heim's
analysis allows shenme 'what' to denote either 'something of kind x' or 'kind x', it seems
impossible to say that one and the same wh-phrase can have two different denotations at the same
time in one single derivation. Thus, one of the coordinate in (29) will receive no interpretation. In
contrast, under my treatment of shenme 'what' as denoting a kind variable, the different
interpretations of shenme 'what' can be ascribed to the different semantics of the predicate and
the across-the-board transformation.
7. Conclusion
As discussed in the text, the semantics of shenme 'what' in Chinese bare conditionals exhibits a
double quantification phenomenon. I have argued that such double quantification can be nicely
accounted for if one adopts Carlson's semantics of bare plurals and verb meanings as well as the
following two assumptions: (i) shenme 'what' is a proform of bare NPs and hence has the same
kind of denotation as bare NPs, and (ii) Chinese bare NPs are names of kinds of things. This
analysis of Chinese bare conditionals lends support to Carlson's approach to bare plurals despite
Wilkinson's attack on it. I also have shown that an extension of Heim's analysis of what as
`something of kind x' to Chinese bare conditionals encounters problems when shenme 'what' is a
shared constituent of a predicate which applies to kinds and another predicate which applies to
objects.
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